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Sleeping Beauty: why violations of probability laws are ‘Deal’ breakers
Beauty (see [3]) is a rational agent participating in an experiment in which a coin is tossed
on Sunday night. She is awakened Monday morning, asked her credence in heads, told
what day it is, asked again her credence in heads, and then debriefed. If the coin landed
heads, that’s the end of the experiment; she’s free to go. If tails, however, Beauty is given a
drug that erases all memory of the experiences she has had since awakening and which puts
her back to sleep. Then on Tuesday morning she is again awakened, asked her credence in
heads, told what day it is, asked again her credence in heads, and then debriefed. That’s
the end of the experiment and she’s free to go. Beauty knows all of this in advance; the
problem is what her initial personal credence in heads should be on Monday morning. A
halfer says one-half. A thirder says one-third. For halfers, there is a second issue: what
Beauty’s credence in heads should be after learning Monday.
Philosophers have gotten fairly worked up about Sleeping Beauty, and have spilled more
than ink in so doing. Most curious are those who have proposed sacrificing laws of prob-
ability, as applied to credences, on her behalf. Jacob Ross for example claims in [13] that
there is a tension between the one-third solution and countable additivity of credences.
Several halfers ([4], [11] and [16]) meanwhile have advocated violations of the law of total
probability for credences.
I see no reason to take serious issue with the naive and majority view (thirding; see [3], [7],
[12], [15], etc.). However, there do seem to be fairly natural situations in which an agent
can maximize utility by acting in concert with the minority view (halfing; see [4], [6], [9],
[10], [11], [16], etc.). So while I will give a brief argument for thirding, that isn’t my focus.
My primary task is rather to defend the laws of probability as applied to both solutions.
My targets here are not lacking in philosophical subtlety; however, I believe they’ve gotten
their mathematics wrong.
1. Thirding and countable additivity.
I will begin this section with a (merely representative) positive argument for thirding,
then address some recently raised doubts. Most halfers, including David Lewis [9], have
maintained that Beauty gains no information from Sunday night to Monday morning.
Many thirders, for example Horgan [7], think that Beauty does gain information, and that
this is the basis for her change in credence. I hold with those who maintain that Beauty
loses information. Beauty hasn’t merely lost track of the time; that much is normative in
rational agency. Rather, she’s lost track of whether she’s done all of this before, in exactly
this way. That’s not normative, and it’s relevant to heads.
According to the bounded martingale stopping theorem, if a non-information losing ra-
tional agent has expected credence r in A at a random, almost surely finite future time
depending only on gathered evidence (i.e. a time at which the agent has it in their power
to say stop), then they have credence r in A now. When time and information are discrete,
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this can be viewed as a continuous version of the:
Law of total probability. If A is a measurable event and B1, B2 partition the sample
space then P (A) = P (B1)P (A|B1) + P (B2)P (A|B2).
A vaguer version with fewer (too few; see [1]) hypotheses was formerly popularized in
philosophical circles by Bass van Fraassen under the name reflection principle. I propose
here an:
Inverse reflection principle. If a non-information gaining rational agent has lost
evidence expressible as conditionalization on a countable partition E , their credence
in A now is equal to the expected value E(A|E) of their prior credence in A.
Regarding the non-information gaining hypothesis, what is important is that the agent’s
gained informationG yields no information about A not already given by conditionalization
on E . That is, P (A|E ∧ G) = P (A|E) for every E ∈ E . This is important below, as
otherwise the argument given for thirding appears to depend crucially on whether or not
Beauty is debriefed on Monday before her memory is wiped. (It should not.)
The argument now runs as follows. Let x be Beauty’s credence in heads during an awak-
ening. I will assume that Beauty accepts Elga’s “restricted principle of indifference” [3],
which says that P (Monday tails) and P (Tuesday tails) share a common value, here 12 (1−x).
She’s lost information potentially relevant to heads. By the inverse reflection principle, her
credence in heads should be equal to its expected prior value. If it’s Monday, the prior
value is that of Sunday night–namely 1
2
. If it’s Tuesday, the prior value is that of moments
before her memory was erased on Monday–namely zero. Beauty’s credence in heads now
should therefore be the expected value of these prior credences, given by the weighted








4x. On the other hand her
credence in heads is x, so we get x = 14 +
1
4x, which has solution x =
1
3 .
So much for the positive argument; I move now to the defense. Ross in [13] claims that
there is a tension between the one-third solution and the principle that rational credences
should be countably additive. His argument has some plausible features, but unfortunately
involves an experimental model that cannot be faithfully implemented at any nomologically
accessible world. At our world, in particular, the model (and hence the argument) isn’t
any good, and, moreover, for reasons long familiar to practitioners of stochastic analysis.
Ross begins by defining a general “Sleeping Beauty problem” to be “a problem in which a
fully rational agent, Beauty, will undergo one or more mutually indistinguishable awaken-
ings...” where the number of such awakenings is a function of a discrete random variable
into a set S of hypotheses. He then claims that thirders are committed to the following
“indifference principle”:
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Finitistic Sleeping Beauty Indifference (FSBI). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, for
any hypothesis h in S, if the number of times Beauty awakens conditional on h is
finite, then upon first awakening, Beauty should have equal credence in each of the
awakening possibilities associated with h.
FSBI, together with some additional premisses (details omitted), leads to the following:
Generalized Thirder Principle (GTP). In any Sleeping Beauty problem, upon first
awakening, Beauty’s credence in any given hypothesis in S must be proportional
to the product of the hypothesis’ objective chance and the number of times Beauty
will awaken conditional on this hypothesis.
The pathological example to follow shows that GTP is in conflict with:
Countable Additivity (CA). For any set of countably many centered or uncentered
propositions, any two of which are incompatible, rationality requires that one’s
credences in the propositions in this set sum to one’s credence in their disjunction.
Here is the example.2
Sleeping Beauty in St. Petersburg (SBSP). Let S = N and suppose that Beauty
awakens 2X times, where X is a random variable with P (X = n) = 2−n, n ∈ N.
If Beauty subscribes to GTP, then in SBSP it would appear that she must assign equal
credences to the exhaustive and mutually exclusive assertions X = n, which violates CA.
It’s easy to see how this argument could become popular–it’s counterintuituve and seem-
ingly plausible at worlds where a literal reading of FSBI, indeed an apparent premiss of
thirders, can be rationally defended. At our world, however, thirders can’t rationally de-
fend such a reading, as they know that with non-zero probability, Beauty will die (for
example) between tails awakenings. That thirders have failed to be explicit about mortal
contingencies (which would rightly be perceived as tedious) is clearly innocent. Neglecting
such remote possibilities simplifies the thirder model, and of course their effect on Beauty’s
credence function vanishes with increasing remoteness. It’s well understood, however, that
2This is a nontechnical exposition, but for those who know of such things, the original
problem corresponds to a positive recurrent Markov chain, the one-third solution deriving
from its stationary probability measure, while SBSP is a null recurrent chain, for which
all stationary distributions are infinite. That null recurrent chains are essentially useless
as models for nomological phenomena is generally accepted; see [5], in particular Example
6.1.1 and Section 6.9 (chapter summary). A representative passage: “There is not much
engineering significance to null recurrence; it is highly sensitive to modeling details over the
entire infinite set of states. One usually uses countably infinite chains to simplify models;
for example, if a buffer is very large and we don’t expect it to overflow, we assume it is
infinite. Finding out, then, that the chain is transient or null recurrent simply means that
the modeling assumption is not very good.”
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to neglect mortality in the class of examples to which SBSP belongs puts the model out
of touch with reality. Indeed, SBSP is so sensitive to conditions of implementation that
acknowledging any fairly time-stationary prospect for mortality whatsoever (that Beauty
might be transformed into a marble bust of Pascal by unfortunate quantum effects will
do) eliminates any perceived conflict with CA.
Some details: when Beauty is explicit about mortality, she employs not FSBI but:
Sleeping Beauty Partiality (SBP). If the number of times Beauty awakens is M ,
then for any hypothesis h in S, upon first awakening, Beauty’s credence in the kth
awakening associated with h should be proportional to Ch(M ≥ k|h).
Here Ch(·) is objective chance. SBP, together with other plausible hypotheses (first night
mortality rates independent of h and credences in first h awakenings proportional to
Ch(h)), implies that Beauty’s absolute credence in the kth awakening associated with
h should be
P (h ∧ k) =
Ch(h) · Ch(M ≥ k|h)∑
j∈S,l∈NCh(j) · Ch(M ≥ l|j)
=
Ch(h) · Ch(M ≥ k|h)
E(M)
.
Summing over k ∈ N, Beauty’s credence in h should be
P (h) =
Ch(h) · E(M |h)
E(M)
.
Define the fidelity of an implementation to be Ch(N = M), where N is the number of
times Beauty is told she will awaken and M is the number of times Beauty does awaken.








We’ve seen that Beauty’s credence in h is P (h) = Ch(h)·E(M|h)
E(M) . Therefore, if E(N) < ∞
then as fidelity approaches 1 Beauty’s credences converge in variation to the distribution
Q(h) = Ch(h)·E(N|h)
E(N) . On the other hand if E(N) = ∞ then as fidelity approaches 1
Beauty’s credence in h approaches zero for every h, and her credences diverge in variation.
In the former case, the distribution Q constitutes a stable solution to the problem. In
the latter case, there is no stable solution, meaning that individual agents cannot avoid
mortality estimates in establishing or even approximating their credences.
This is consistent with CA and recovers the one-third solution, modulo agreement that
thirder Beauty may assign credence 13 + ǫ to heads for a smallish ǫ. Diehard thirders who
insist on ǫ = 0 meanwhile may indeed run afoul of CA per [13]. Where rational, however,
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such thirders inhabit nomologically (at least) inaccessible worlds.3
2. Halfing and the law of total probability
Lewis [9] bases his halfing scheme on the following premiss: (L1) Only new relevant evi-
dence, centred or uncentred, produces a change in credence; and the evidence (H1∨T1∨T2)
(sic) is not relevant to HEADS versus TAILS. Here of course H1 is Monday heads, T1 is
Monday tails and T2 is Tuesday tails. As I explained in the first section, I don’t think this
premiss is correct. Beauty loses information, that information is relevant to heads, and
Beauty must, as it turns out, have credence 13 in heads. However, I don’t think that makes
halfing uninteresting. Indeed, there are natural protocols governing the allocation of utility
that call for Beauty to act as if her credence in heads were 12 . The distinguishing feature
of these protocols is that only one tails awakening is significant to Beauty’s well-being.
For example, Bostrom [4] proposes a thought experiment (Beauty the high roller) where
bets are offered to Beauty on Mondays only. (Suppose fake bets are offered on Tuesdays.)
Given such a protocol, Beauty should behave as a halfer in the style of Hawley [6], who
assigns Monday probability 1 conditioned on tails. Less arbitrarily, if one real bet were to
be offered, but on Monday or Tuesday with equal likelihood conditioned on tails, Beauty
should act in concert with Peter J. Lewis [10]’s quantum Sleeping Beauty interpretation.
Shaw [14] introduces (in essence) bets that Beauty can make only (and only once) by
agreeing to them during each awakening of the experiment. Such a protocol is consistent
with David Lewis [9]’s answer (familiar to any statistician) to tails world oversampling:
sample weight dilution of the tails awakenings.
3Infinite expectation (or something similar) appears to play a hidden role in some other
thought experiments against thirding, for example, Bostrom [4]’s Presumptuous Philoso-
pher and Meacham [10]’s Many Brains Argument. In Bostrom’s example (Meacham’s is
similar) we are asked to imagine learning that the number of observers X in the universe
is either M or N >> M , and are told that it would be “presumptuous” to claim that the
latter was N
M
times likelier based solely on thirder reasoning. Such a claim depends on the
hypothetical prior probability ofN observers being equal to that ofM observers, and where
this artificial condition is satisfied the case for presumption is weak (if there are such worlds
in equal numbers then “presumptuous” observers are vindicated in precise proportion to
their “presumption”). In less artificial cases, the hypothetical prior probabilities (hk) of k
observers should meet the finite expectation requirement
∑
k khk < ∞, so that typically
hk decays faster than
1
k
and the philosopher doesn’t even have the attitude deemed pre-
sumptuous, indeed asymptotically favors the smaller value M . Some philosophers have
done a good job of tracing paradox to the use of models involving infinite expectations
(e.g. David Chalmers [2]’s outstanding analysis of the Two Envelopes problem), but have
been hesitant to characterize such use as misuse. However, if sincerely practicing scientists
never require models assigning infinite expectation to physical quantities, the burden of
proving their relevance to rational agency plainly lies with those whose appeals do.
5
Of course, one can’t just pick any protocol whatsoever. (This could spawn fourthers,
fifthers, e
pi
thers, etc.) True, what bears utility for Beauty isn’t specified; the idea, presum-
ably, is to use what is specified to identify natural candidates. One thing that is specified
is the number of awakenings. That, it could be argued, is all we’ve got to go on. Hence
thirding. But we are given something else. Beauty is a rational agent. Rational agents
traffick in information for its own sake. Being right about how things are is intrinsically
pleasing; being wrong is intrinsically displeasing. The question is: does this (dis)pleasure
more resemble the pleasure of those who like to travel, or of those who like having travelled?
Asked another way: with respect to information consumption, do rational agents live to
eat, or eat to live? Thirders, it would appear, live to eat. Halfers eat to live. And if in fact
there’s an ambiguity here, Beauty’s personal credence in heads may be as underspecified
as what a bulimic had for lunch.
I’m going to just take it that this sort of hand-waving about how information isn’t neces-
sarily subject to double counting makes plausible the assumption of a protocol friendly to
a one-half solution. This vindicates (if aphoristically) the one-half solutions in [6], [9], and
[10]. However, it does not vindicate halfing schemes that update propositional credences
in light of de se evidence by conditioning on the proposition corresponding to the set of
worlds consistent with the evidence. I’ll call this sort of scheme ([4], [11] and [16] are my
intended targets) Passepartoutian halfing (after the valet of Phileas Fogg). Passepartout,
figuring perhaps that London time is the one true time, is reluctant to advance his pocket
watch when entering a new time zone; if only he can ride out his master’s travels and
get back to London, his watch will be back in line with those of locals and all will be
well. The Passepartoutian halfer, meanwhile, perhaps figuring that objective chance is the
one true probability, is reluctant to change her propositional credences in light of merely
de se evidence; if only she can ride out the scenarios involving indiscriminable collocated
alternatives, her credences will be back in line with objective chance (and all will be well).
Bostrom refers to his brand of Passepartoutian halfing as a “hybrid model”. Indeed it is,
and is the worse for it: it consistently reflects neither Beauty’s expectations (minimization
of real time surprisal), nor her best course of action under any natural protocol. Like all
of the schemes I am criticizing, all it has going for it are two plausible yet incompatible
intuitions: that (1) Lewis’s lemma (L1) is correct, and (2) if Beauty learns Monday (thus
eliminating multiplication of collocated alternatives), probabilities should revert to objec-
tive chance. The reason that these intuitions are incompatible is that acting in accord with
(1) involves an implicit presumption that there is just one net significant tails awakening
(otherwise Beauty’s lost certainty as to which this was would be relevant to heads). But in
that case, for all Beauty knows upon learning Monday, she is experiencing an awakening
of diminished or no significance if tails–which favors heads.
Of course, it should not be surprising to Monty Hall aficionados that the hidden role of
protocol in halfing should be opaque to naive intuition, and we can use the problem to
dramatize what’s wrong with the Passepartoutian scheme. Suppose that a big prize is
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hidden behind one of three doors, each with equal objective chance. The hypothesis Door
i corresponds to the state of affairs in which the big prize is behind Door i. If Door 1,
then Beauty will have a single awakening, on Monday. If Door 2, Beauty will have a single
awakening, on Tuesday. And, if Door 3, Beauty will have two awakenings, on Monday and
Tuesday. Halfers of course assign each of the alternatives credence 13 upon awakening.
Suppose now that a halfer learns what day it is, and is asked for her updated credence in
Door 3. Note: if Monday, Door 1 is eliminated. If Tuesday, Door 2 is eliminated. Door
3 cannot be eliminated. Recall that our halfer has prior credence 1
3
in Door i for each i
and, if she accepts Elga’s principle, Monday and Tuesday are equally likely conditioned on
Door 3. Suppose our halfer learns Monday. Since the current protocol is isomorphic to
that of the Monty Hall problem, her situation is precisely that of a Monty Hall contestant
that has initially chosen Door 3 and seen the hypothesis Door 1 eliminated.
The Passepartoutian halfer, then, who updates credences by conditioning on not Door 1,
is committing the well-known fallacy of those who answer 12 in the Monty Hall problem, in
defiance of the understood protocols. On the contrary, Beauty’s credence in Door 3 must
remain 1
3
. Anything else violates the law of total probability, not to mention common





learning what day it is regardless of what day it is. If that’s all Beauty’s got, she needs to
revisit thirding.
Indeed, this is essentially Rosenthal’s ([12]) argument for thirding; alter the original prob-
lem so that the single heads awakening occurs on either Monday or Tuesday (with equal
probability). Rosenthal takes it as uncontentious (Passepartoutian halfers agree) that
Beauty’s credence in heads upon learning Monday is 1
3
. Since the same holds for Tuesday,
absolute credence in heads must be 1
3
by the law of total probability.
To recapitulate: the reason that halfer probabilities don’t revert to objective chance upon
elimination of collocated alternatives is that halfer probabilities aren’t absolute credences;
they’re conditioned credences. They track, under a natural class of utility allocation pro-
tocols, Beauty’s credences conditioned on its mattering one way or the other. They are,
for all that, nevertheless probabilities, and must in particular be updated in the standard
way, i.e. by conditionalization. Like Fogg’s valet, whose obstinacy couldn’t account for
the International Date Line, and who would thereby have squandered his master’s fortune
but for an accident, halfers who don’t conform will require, in the long run, many such
accidents to preserve their own.
Conclusion. I’ve maintained that the one-third solution is best for the Sleeping Beauty
problem as formulated, but for some arguably natural protocols governing the allocation
of utility, behavior consistent with a one-half solution may be optimal. It’s important for
halfers to remember, however, which protocols support their scheme, lest their intuitions
fail them as to how to update the conditioned credences they favor in light of de se evidence.
The primary moral, for halfers and thirders alike: credences are probabilities!
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